LDR 711A Week 3 Behavioral and Contingency Approaches Example

Directive on the Airfield, Participative in the Terminal? Behavioral and Contingency Theories Applied to Airport Irregular Operations

[Student Name]

University of Phoenix

LDR/711A: Leadership Theory and Practice

Week 3 Assignment

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

Cascade Valley Regional Airport, its staff and its events are composites written for a model paper.

The first two papers looked at the invented Cascade Valley airport on the night ice shut it down and left about 1,600 travelers sleeping in the terminal. Skills, especially social judgment, explained differences among managers. This week turns to behavior and situation. Director of operations Marisol Vega led two very different efforts that night. On the airfield, she directed snow and ice crews precisely, assigning runways, taxiways and deicing pads in sequence, and the runways were back in service well before the forecast said they would be. In the terminal, she used the same directive approach with airline station managers, security screening supervisors and concession managers, issuing instructions by radio. Several resisted, one airline gave passengers its own reopening estimate and concessions closed early despite her request to stay open. The question here is whether situational theories can account for one style succeeding outside on the runways and faltering inside the terminal.

The Contingency Idea

Contingency approaches hold that no single leadership style is best; effectiveness depends on the fit between leader behavior and the situation. Theories differ in which situational factors they emphasize and in how much evidence supports them.

Fiedler's Contingency Model

In Fiedler's account, a leader's results hinge on whether a stable leaning toward getting the job done or toward people suits how much control the setting gives the leader, which depends on relations with the group, how clear the work is and how much formal power comes with the role. Peters et al. (1985) conducted a meta-analysis of tests of the model and found partial support: laboratory studies generally supported the theory's predictions, while field studies supported some predictions but not others. The model captures something real but is not a complete guide.

The Normative Decision Model

Vroom and Jago (2007) discussed the role of the situation in leadership and described their normative model of decision making, which recommends how much to involve others depending on situational factors such as the importance of the decision, the importance of commitment from others, the leader's expertise, the likelihood that others will commit to a decision made alone, whether others share organizational goals, others' expertise and time pressure. They argued that situational variance in behavior is larger than variance across leaders and that effective leaders adapt their decision process to each situation.

Situational Leadership Theory

Situational leadership theory prescribes matching directive and supportive behavior to followers' readiness. Thompson and Vecchio (2009) compared the original model with two later revisions using matched reports from staff and their bosses, and the support they found was thin. Some predictions held for less ready employees, but the theory's core prescriptions for matching style to readiness were not consistently supported. They suggested the theory's popularity outruns its evidence.

The Airfield Situation

On the airfield, crews reported to Marisol's managers, tasks were highly structured, time pressure was intense and Marisol held most of the relevant expertise. Crews were committed to the shared goal of reopening and expected direction. In Fiedler's terms, the situation was favorable for a task-oriented leader. In Vroom and Jago's terms, commitment was likely even if Marisol decided alone, and her expertise was high, so a directive process was appropriate.

The Terminal Situation

In the terminal, Marisol had no formal authority over airline, screening or concession staff, the problem was unstructured and the relevant information was spread among partners: airlines knew crew availability and rebooking options; screening supervisors knew staffing; concessionaires knew food supplies. Commitment from partners was essential, and they were unlikely to accept decisions made without them. The decision model would recommend a consultative or group process.

On the airfield, Marisol held both the authority and the information; in the terminal she held neither, yet she led as if she held both.

Comparing the Models on the Storm

Fiedler's model predicts the airfield success but offers little guidance for the terminal, since it treats leader orientation as fixed rather than adjustable. Situational leadership theory focuses on follower readiness, which was high in both settings, so it does not explain the difference. The normative decision model fits best: its factors of commitment, information location and authority distinguish the two settings and prescribe different processes.

What a Consultative Approach Would Have Looked Like

A consultative approach in the terminal would have convened airline station managers, the screening supervisor and concession managers in a short video call at the start of the closure to share information, agree on a single passenger message and divide tasks, with Marisol making final calls where agreement failed. The call would have taken 20 minutes and likely prevented conflicting messages.

Behavior Within the Situation

Behavioral research on task and relationship orientation, examined in earlier courses, also helps. On the airfield, task-oriented behavior was sufficient. In the terminal, relationship-oriented behaviors, such as consulting and showing consideration for partners' constraints, were needed but absent.

Prediction Versus Explanation

A scholar-practitioner should ask whether these models could have predicted the outcome in advance. The decision model could have: its factors were knowable before the storm. This makes it useful for planning, not only for explaining events afterward.

Partners' Perspective

Interviews with partners after the storm help explain the terminal failure. An airline station manager said that he received radio instructions from the airport but had his own company's procedures and a duty manager at headquarters telling him something different. The screening supervisor said she could not keep checkpoints open without federal approval, which no one asked her about. A concession manager said no one explained why staying open mattered or offered to help pay overtime. Each partner faced constraints Marisol did not know, which is precisely the situation in which the decision model recommends consultation.

Testing the Model in Later Events

The value of a contingency model lies in prediction. In a later fog delay that stranded about 400 passengers, Marisol convened a short partner call before issuing instructions. Messages to passengers were consistent, concessions stayed open with the authority covering overtime and complaints fell sharply compared with the storm. One event proves little, but it is consistent with the model's prescription.

Implications for Crisis Plans

The airport's emergency plan will specify two modes: a directive mode for airfield and safety decisions within the authority's control and a consultative mode for terminal and passenger decisions involving partners, with a standing passenger coordination call at the start of any closure longer than two hours.

Implications for Marisol's Practice

Marisol will practice diagnosing situations using the decision model's factors before choosing a process, especially asking who holds information and whose commitment matters.

Limits of Contingency Theories

Contingency models simplify situations into a few variables and often neglect relationships built over time, culture and emotions. They also assume leaders can diagnose situations accurately under stress, which is difficult during a crisis. These limits point to relational and shared approaches in later weeks.

Conclusion

Contingency approaches hold that effective behavior depends on the situation, but their evidence varies: Fiedler's model has partial support, situational leadership theory limited support and the normative decision model offers a useful, testable framework. Applied to the ice storm, the decision model explains why directive leadership succeeded on the airfield and failed in the terminal, and it offers a planning tool for future crises.

References

Peters, L. H., Hartke, D. D., & Pohlmann, J. T. (1985). Fiedler's contingency theory of leadership: An application of the meta-analysis procedures of Schmidt and Hunter. Psychological Bulletin, 97(2), 274-285. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.97.2.274

Thompson, G., & Vecchio, R. P. (2009). Situational leadership theory: A test of three versions. The Leadership Quarterly, 20(5), 837-848. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2009.06.014

Vroom, V. H., & Jago, A. G. (2007). The role of the situation in leadership. American Psychologist, 62(1), 17-24. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.62.1.17