ORG 535 Week 2 Applying Motivation Theory Example

Why Operators Leave After Ninety Days: Applying Motivation Theory to Line Work at a Food Packaging Plant

[Student Name]

University of Phoenix

ORG/535: People and Organizations

Week 2 Assignment

[Instructor Name]

[Date]

The plant, its workforce, survey results and figures are composites written for a model paper.

The composite food packaging plant in Ohio that I lead, introduced in Week 1, fills and packs snack products on 14 lines across three shifts. Of about 160 line operators, 38 percent leave each year, and roughly two in three departures happen within ninety days of the hire date. Each departure costs about $4,500 in recruiting, training and lost productivity, about $270,000 a year. Wages are at the local median for manufacturing. This paper uses motivation theory to understand why operators leave and what the plant can do.

The Evidence

Exit interviews over the past year, 61 in all, and an anonymous survey of current operators produced consistent themes. New operators said schedules rotated with only a few days' notice, which wrecked plans for child care and for second jobs. They described the work as repetitive, standing at one station for an entire shift. They said they received little feedback except when something went wrong. And many said supervisors seemed to notice only mistakes. Operators who stayed beyond a year more often mentioned a supervisor or coworker who helped them in their first weeks.

Expectancy Theory

Vroom's expectancy theory asks three questions of any incentive from the worker's side: can I do what is asked if I try, will doing it actually earn the reward and do I want that reward? Van Eerde and Thierry (1996) conducted a meta-analysis of studies testing expectancy models and found modest relationships between the model's components and work outcomes, with stronger results when the components were analyzed within individuals. The plant's main incentive, a $300 quarterly attendance bonus, illustrates the problem. Because one late arrival forfeits it, and rotating schedules make lateness likely, new operators reported that they did not expect to earn it. The bonus fails at the link between effort and outcome.

Goal-Setting Theory

Locke and Latham (2002) summarized decades of research showing that precise, stretching targets beat vague ones, so long as workers accept the target and can see how they are doing while there is still time to adjust. Each line has a daily output target posted on a whiteboard, but results are reported only the next morning. Without feedback during the shift, the goal cannot guide effort. The theory suggests making goals visible by hour and giving immediate feedback.

Self-Determination Theory

Deci and Ryan (2000) argued that people's motivation is sustained when three needs are met: having some say over one's own work, feeling skilled at it and feeling connected to the people around. Supervision at the plant is controlling, with supervisors correcting errors publicly and giving operators little say in how they work. New operators are often trained for one day and then left at a station, undermining competence. The finding that stayers mentioned a helpful coworker fits the relatedness need closely. Of the four theories, this one explains the most themes in the data.

Operators did not leave because the bonus was too small; they left because nobody had shown them they could earn it or helped them belong.

The Job Characteristics Model

Hackman and Oldham (1976) proposed that five core job characteristics, such as how varied the work is, whether a person completes a whole piece of it, how much it matters to others, how much freedom it allows and how much it tells the worker about results, produce critical psychological states that lead to motivation and satisfaction, and their test of the model supported these links. Operator jobs score low on variety, identity and feedback. Rotating operators among stations every two hours, giving each line team responsibility for its own quality checks and showing teams where their products go, a national brand's shelves, could raise all three.

Where the Theories Fit and Fall Short

Expectancy theory explains the failure of the bonus but says little about relationships. Goal-setting explains why targets do not motivate but assumes goals are the main driver. Self-determination theory explains the supervision and belonging themes best. The job characteristics model offers concrete design changes but was developed mostly with individual jobs, not paced production lines, so its effects may be smaller here. Equity theory was considered, but wages are at market and few operators mentioned pay comparisons.

Individual Differences

Not every operator wants the same things. Survey responses showed that operators supporting families valued predictable schedules above all, younger operators valued learning new stations and the chance to become a line lead and several long-serving operators valued being asked for their opinion. A plan built only on schedules, or only on job design, would reach some groups and miss others, which is why the recommendations combine several levers.

What the Plant Tried Before

Two years ago the plant raised starting pay by $1.50 an hour. Turnover fell briefly and returned to its old level within six months, consistent with the survey finding that pay was rarely the main reason operators left. That history supports focusing on schedules, the first ninety days and supervision rather than another pay increase.

Recommendations

Fixed schedules posted two weeks ahead, with shift swaps managed through an app: addresses expectancy and autonomy. Cost: scheduling software about $12,000 a year.

A first-ninety-days program: three days of training, a peer mentor for each new operator, check-ins at days 7, 30 and 60. Addresses competence and relatedness. Cost: about $60,000 a year in mentor pay and training time.

Hourly goals with screens showing progress on each line: addresses goal-setting feedback. Cost: about $40,000 one time.

Station rotation every two hours and line-level quality checks: addresses job characteristics.

Supervisor coaching on recognition and private correction: addresses autonomy and relatedness.

Replace the attendance bonus with a monthly bonus for team attendance and quality, with partial credit.

Supervisors as the Lever

All four theories point to supervisors. They control whether schedules feel fair, whether goals come with feedback, whether new operators feel supported and whether operators are trusted to make small decisions. The plant's supervisors earned their jobs by running lines well and have never been taught how to coach. A four-session program, run by the human resources manager with the plant manager attending, will cover giving specific recognition, correcting in private, onboarding new operators and running a short start-of-shift huddle that reviews yesterday's results and today's goal. Supervisors will be measured partly on ninety-day retention in their crews.

Measures

Ninety-day retention, annual turnover, attendance, line output and a quarterly operator engagement survey. A target of reducing annual turnover from 38 to 25 percent would cut replacement spending by roughly $90,000 a year, and output from experienced crews would add to that.

Conclusion

Operator turnover at the plant reflects motivation problems the data make visible: incentives people do not believe they can earn, goals without feedback, controlling supervision and lonely first weeks on repetitive jobs. Expectancy, goal-setting, self-determination and job characteristics theories each explain part of the pattern, with self-determination theory explaining most. The recommendations follow from the theories and will be judged by retention and engagement over the next year.

References

Deci, E. L., & Ryan, R. M. (2000). The "what" and "why" of goal pursuits: Human needs and the self-determination of behavior. Psychological Inquiry, 11(4), 227-268. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1104_01

Hackman, J. R., & Oldham, G. R. (1976). Motivation through the design of work: Test of a theory. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 16(2), 250-279. https://doi.org/10.1016/0030-5073(76)90016-7

Locke, E. A., & Latham, G. P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and task motivation: A 35-year odyssey. American Psychologist, 57(9), 705-717. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.57.9.705

Van Eerde, W., & Thierry, H. (1996). Vroom's expectancy models and work-related criteria: A meta-analysis. Journal of Applied Psychology, 81(5), 575-586. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.81.5.575